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domestic fraud and collusion, but that is not a proper basis for the denial
of a right to recovery. 1 7
It is submitted that the holding in the present case is a forward step in
allowing recovery in tort for personal injuries. Those reasons denominated
public policy which the courts have held constitute a bar to the maintenance
of intra-family suits are inapplicable to the situation presented by a suit
between two unemancipated minors in the same family, and there is some
doubt as to their applicability at all under present-day conditions. The Court
of Appeals in the principal case examined the classical rule in the light of
modern economic and social progress and recognized that it may be outdated
and outmoded. The court seemed to suggest that it may change such rule
without waiting for legislative action. Considering the dominant part which
the automobile plays in modern life and the widespread use of insurance to
avoid losses from motoring accidents, the development of tort law in the
direction here indicated is both needed and justifiable.IS S. C.
EVIDENCE-TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY-ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDGMENTS APPOINT-
ING GUARDIANs.-The plaintiffs, heirs at law, contested a will, made in 1926
by the testatrix who died in 1936, on the ground of unsoundness of mind at the
time of making the will. Defendants are the administratrix and devisees.
Plaintiffs introduced over defendants' objection a judgment in 1928 appointing
a guardian for testatrix because of incompetency to manage her estate. Held,
reversed. Where the issue is the unsoundness of mind of the person at the
time of making a will, a subsequent judgment appointing a guardian because of
incompetency' to manage the estate is not admissible as evidence. Lasher v.
Gerlach (Ind. App. 1939), 23 N. E. (2d) 296.
17 "If it should appear that there is any foundation for the suggestion, a
means of protection may be found in diligence on the part of the insurance
carriers to ferret out and expose the fictitious claims and reliance may be
placed on our courts and juries to detect and prevent a fraud." Rozell v.
Rozell (N. Y., 1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 254. See, LoGalbo v. LoGalbo (1930),
138 Misc. Rep. 485, 246 N. Y. S. 565, p. 568.
18 Insurance has been considered as an important factor in recent cases
involving this and similar problems and, it is contended, will be more so in
the future, no matter what the actual language used by the courts may be.
Said Lord Blackburn in Young v. Rankin (1934), S. C. 499, p. 514: "The
practice of a parent insuring himself against claims which may arise out of
his own negligence in the conduct of some particular matter is of very recent
date, and had such practice existed at an earlier date I have no doubt that
the very question that is raised in this action would have been brought before
the courts long ago, for I do not see anything unnatural in a minor recovering
damages from his parent where the parent is himself covered against any
loss incurred by him as the result of his negligence. I, accordingly, attach little
importance to the fact that there are no reported cases on the subject."
Possibly the desired result may be achieved in an indirect manner through
legislative action requiring compulsory insuranec for automobiles and allowing
recovery to be had directly from an insurer by the one injured through the
negligence of the insured. See, Mesite v. Kirchstein (1929), 109 Conn. 77,
145 At. 753, 755.
1 Incompetency as used herein designates the disabilities set out in Burns
Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), sec. 8-301; Ind. Acts 1911, ch. 218, sec. 1, p. 533, and
Ind. Acts 1919, ch. 106, sec. 1, p. 580. As to what constitutes unsoundness of
mind see Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), see. 8-202; 2 Ind. R. S. 1852, ch. 14,
see. 2, p. 333, and Ind. Acts 1895, ch. 99, sec. 1, p. 205.
RECENT CASE NOTES
A judgment usually is not admissible as evidence of facts upon which the
judgment is founded.2 Guardianship proceedings involving the unsoundness
of mind of an individual however, concern status, and being public actions
similar in nature to actions in rem are often admissible where other judg-
ments are not.3 The two problems involved in cases of this type are: (1) the
relevancy of the judgment, i. e., the identity of the issues, and (2), the time,
i. e., the remoteness from the time in question. Adjudications of insanity are
directly in point in cases of will contest for unsoundness of mind and therefore
are relevant as evidence on that point.4 The time of judgment, whether prior,
contemporaneous, or subsequent to the time of making the will, being a ques-
tion of remoteness usually goes only to the weight of evidence, although it
occasionally involves admissibility. In proving unsoundness of mind at a
particular time, for practical reasons it is held that facts or occurrences both
prior and subsequent to the time in question are admissible.5 This is not the
same as the question of whether the judgment is admissible. Since unsound-
ness of mind is usually a continuing condition there is a rebuttable presumption
that a person once adjudicated to be of unsound mind remains that way until
adjudged sane.8 The presumption that a party adjudicated to be of unsound
mind was under this disability at any particular time prior to the judgment is
slight however, unless there is a specific finding of that fact in the judgment.7
Therefore a prior adjudication of unsoundness of mind is almost always ad-
missible whereas a subsequent one is sometimes inadmissible and at least of
less weight.8 The application of these principles to judgments of incompetency
to manage estates has resulted in much confusion.
While a judgment appointing a guardian on the ground of unsoundness of
mind may be strictly relevant, a judgment appointing a guardian because of
incompetency to manage an estate need not involve the same issues as capacity
to make a will. A guardian may be appointed where there is no mental con-
dition involved, as in the case of drunkards, spendthrifts, or even where
physical disabilities prevent competent management of the estate.9  If the
2 Maple v. Beach (1873), 43 Ind. 51).
3 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (16th ed.), § 556.
4 Stevens v. Stevens (1891), 127 Ind. 560, 26 N. E. 1078; Pepper v. Martin
(1910), 175 Ind. 580, 92 N. E. 777.
U Peters v. Knight (1937), 103 Ind. App. 453, 8 N. E. (2d) 401; Ailes v.
Ailes (1937), 104 Ind. App. 302, 11 N. E. (2d) 73. Cf. Profer v. Profer (1938),
342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035; In re Piney's Will (1880), 27 Minn. 280,
6 N. NV. 791.
0Rush v. Magee (1871), 36 Ind. 69; Redden v. Baker (1832), 86 Ind. 191.
7 "In some states the statute authorizes the inquiry de lunatico to be extended
to a time anterior to the inquiry itself; but our statute does not authorize a
retroactive inquiry to be made, or statute fixed. . . ." Taylor v. Taylor (1910),
174 Ind. 670, 93 N. E. 9. Cf. Spiers v. Hendershott (1909), 142 Ia. 446, 120
N. MT. 1058; Weisterland v. First Nat. Bank (1917), 38 N. D. 24, 164 N. W.
323; In re Weber's Will (1928), 196 Wis. 377, 220 N. W. 380; Wetzal v. Fire-
baugh (1910), 251 Il. 190, 95 N. E. 1085; In re Weedman's Estate (1912), 254
Ill. 504, 98 N. E. 956.
8 Weisterland v. First Nat. Bank (1917), 38 N. D. 24, 164 N. W. 323. Cf.
Spiers v. Hendershott (1909), 142 Ia. 446, 120 N. W. 1058; Kelley v. Stanton
(1922), 141 Md. 380, 118 A. 863; Digan v. Linilon (1928), 262 Mass. 273, 159
N. E. 610; Green v. Green (1893), 145 Ill. 264, 33 N. E. 941.
9 Champ v. Brown (1936), 197 Minn. 49, 266 N. XV. 94. Burns Ind. Stat.
Ann. (1933), sec. 8-301, Ind. Acts 1911, ch. 218, sec. 1, p. 533, and Ind. Acts
1919, ch. 106, sec. 1, p. 580.
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mental capacity of the party is involved, a much higher capacity is required to
manage an estate than to make a will.3O Thus although one can quite properly
say that a person of unsound mind is incompetent to manage an estate, one
cannot reason that a person incompetent to manage an estate is of unsound
mind. Judgments appointing guardians for incompetency to manage an estate
which do not specifically find unsoundness of mind are irrelevant and should
not be admissible on the issue of testamentary capacity. Where the judgment
is subsequent or remote in time it might in addition be inadmissible because
of remoteness.1 1
It is believed that the failure to distinguish clearly between these two types
of guardianship proceedings is partially the cause of the confusion in this
field. Of the few states which have been consistent concerning the admissibility
of judgments appointing guardians on the ground of incompetency to manage
the estate the majority have held them inadmissible.12 Indiana has authority
on both sides although on the question of subsequent judgments the weight
seems on the side of inadmissibility.13 The case favoring the admission of
such judgments is one in which the guardianship proceedings was defeated and
the party held competent to manage his estate.1 4
There is no logical need for admitting these judgments as the actual
facts and occurrences on which the judgments were based are always admis-
sible and the courts are in unanimous agreement that the judgment is not
conclusive even if unsoundness of mind was the issue.1 5 In reality the admis-
sion of such judgments is highly prejudicial as it will undoubtedly give a
bolstering effect to the other evidence admitted. It is submitted therefore, that
the present case in distinguishing between the admissibility of judgments of
unsoundnss of mind and those of incompetency to manage estates is adequately
supported by authority both in Indiana and in other states and is following
the more logical and desirable rule in litigation involving testamentary
capacity. W. E. B.
10 Pittard v. Foster (1882), 12 Ill. App. 132. Cf. Watson v. Watson (1910),
137 Ky. 25, 121 S. W. 626; Taylor v. Taylor (1910), 174 Ind. 670, 93 N. E. 9;
Emry v. Beaver (1922), 192 Ind. 471, 137 N. E. 55; Harison v. Bishop (1892),
131 Ind. 161, 30 N. E. 1069.
11 Lane v. Moore (1898), 151 Mass. 87, 23 N. E. 828.
12 Holding such judgments inadmissible: Entwistle v. Meikle (1899), 180
Ill. 9, 54 N. E. 217; Watson v. Watson (1910), 137 Ky. 25, 121 S. W. 626;
In re Gahagan's Estate (1912), 102 Neb. 404, 167 N. W. 412; In re Weber's
Will (1928), 196 Wisc. 377, 220 N. W. 380; Weisterland v. First Nat. Bank
(1917), 38 N. D. 24, 164- N. W. 323; Kish v. Bakayas (1938), 330 Pa. 533, 199
A. 321. But see McAllister v. Rowland (1913), 124 Minn. 27, 144 N. W. 412;
In re Van Houton's Will (1910), 147 Ia. 725, 124 N. W. 886.
13 Taylor v. Taylor (1910), 174 Ind. 670, 93 N. E. 9. But see Emry v.
Beaver (1922), 192 Ind. 471, 137 N. E. 55.
14 Since competency to manage an estate necessitates a higher mental
capacity than making a will a judgment of competency to manage estate is
relevant as to testamentary capacity. Emry v. Beaver (1922), 192 Ind. 471,
137 N. E. 55. Cf. Kish v. Bakaysa (1938), 330 Pa. 533, 199 A. 321. In re Van
Houton's Will (1910), 147 Ia. 725, 124 N. W. 886.
15 Even though held insane on Feb. 22, the judgment was not conclusive
as to Jan. 23 of the same year. Spiers v. Hendershott (1909), 142 Ia. 446, 120
N. W. 1058. Cf. Holiday v. Shepard (1915), 269 Il. 429, 109 N. E. 976;
Pepper v. Martin (1910), 175 Ind. 580, 92 N. E. 777; Kelly v. Stanton (1922),
141 Md. 380, 118 A. 863.
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